

documents, particularly the autobiographical, biographical, and familial, provide the historian a more direct glimpse into patrician values and identity" (p. 141), an identity layered with multiple accretions.

Jurdjevic claims his study is "as much about the social and political uses of family memory . . . as it is a study of [a] specific and historically discrete family" (p. 10). But it remains a bit unclear whether to take the Valori as a typical or ideal-typical Florentine family. Was their involvement in intellectual patronage typical? Was their self-conscious devotion to republicanism and reform typical? And were they actually as reflective on the meaning of Florentine republicanism as Jurdjevic states, even as they practiced a complex engagement with republican institutions? Hopefully future studies will address these questions. While the Valori may have fancied themselves "guardians" of republicanism, more crucially they were engaged—through their friendships, practices, and politics—in an ongoing struggle to define for themselves exactly what republicanism meant. Showing how politics and self-constructions were concretely linked to the various isms that we take to be definitive of Renaissance Florence: this, I believe, will prove to be this book's most enduring contribution.

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PAUL F. GRENDLER. *The University of Mantua, the Gonzaga, and the Jesuits, 1584–1630*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2009. Pp. xx, 287. \$60.00..

This book tells a story worth telling, the little-known history of the short-lived University of Mantua (1625–1629) and its place in Italian Renaissance culture. Because of his prior work on Italian universities, Paul F. Grendler does a good job of situating the university within the educational and cultural patterns of Renaissance Italy. It was the brainchild of the exceptionally cultured prince of Mantua, Duke Ferdinando Gonzaga (1587–1626). Working in concert with the Jesuit Order, which had had great difficulty in gaining a major foothold in the Italian university system, Duke Ferdinando first orchestrated the establishment of a Jesuit college in Mantua in 1624 and then combined the Jesuit school with the university at the latter's inauguration the next year. Tragically, a local succession conflict pulled Mantua into the pan-European Bourbon-Hapsburg struggle. The university dissolved in the fall of 1629 as the city prepared to withstand a siege by imperial troops. The Jesuit school survived the devastating siege and sack of Mantua, but the university itself never came back.

Grendler has made a fair-sized book out of this brief history by expatiating upon Ferdinando Gonzaga, which is reasonable given his seminal role, and by going on at length about almost any other relevant topic. For instance, the Jesuits formally constituted half the university faculty, teaching everything but the subjects of law, medicine, and natural philosophy. But Mantua would seem a weak reed upon which to construct a

lengthy analysis of the whole Jesuit educational enterprise, not only because of the short duration of the university but also because virtually all the major Jesuit texts and figures discussed by Grendler had little directly to do with Mantua. One could say the same about Grendler's discussion of the lead law professor, Alessandro Marta, whose long and illustrious career involved Mantua only in the last four years of his life. The oddest of these excursions is the last chapter, which spans twenty pages, of which only five actually deal with the university rather than with contemporary politics, family feuds, and military affairs. Some of the extra material is original with the author, and he may have wanted to ensure its publication. But much is secondary and could have been condensed.

More troublesome is the clear evidence that Grendler has a very shaky grasp of Latin. This is obvious at the start and end when he mixes up Latin and Italian (p. xv: *ab uova* [*sic*]; "egg" in Italian is *uovo*) instead of *ab ovo*; p. 242: translating *Martha qui* as "Martha here" instead of "Martha who") and numerous times in between, when as often as not he botches in one way or another the translation of simple Latin titles (e.g., on p. 159, he does not understand that *institutio* means in this context "inauguration" or "foundation" and not "education"; or on p. 184, where a long title leads to multiple errors in translation). This failing is not disabling as long as Grendler sticks to institutional history with its teaching rosters, course lists, formulaic declarations, and such, or can rely on translations and good secondary literature on substantive intellectual issues. But since universities and schooling in general were intellectual pursuits dominated by an untold number of discursive Latin texts well into the eighteenth century, his judgment on texts can only remain suspect. Also, there is what may be called, in economic terminology, a vast opportunity cost. One cannot have insights into or make discoveries in texts one cannot read accurately. The basic contours of the institutional history Grendler lays out seem sound enough to me. But intelligent use of secondary literature and reliance on translations will only take you so far in exploiting the ocean of Latin texts in manuscript and printed form that need to be studied to have a deep understanding of premodern education and learning.

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MAURICE MAUVIEL and ELSO SIMONE SERPENTINI. *Enrico Sappia: Cospiratore e agente segreto di Mazzini*. (Historia, number 1.) Mosciano Sant'Angelo: Artemia Edizioni. 2009. Pp. 545. €25.00.

If an adventurous life were enough to secure a place in history, Enrico Sappia (1833–1906) might well have earned one. He left his native city of Nice and his family at age fifteen to join the revolutionaries of 1848, was at Giuseppe Mazzini's side during the short-lived Roman Republic of 1849, then joined the flood of political ref-

ugees who wandered from place to place until he was arrested in Naples in December 1850 for plotting to assassinate King Ferdinand II. The Sardinian government, to which he was subject, secured his release from jail in January 1854. Sappia then linked up again with Mazzini in London, and proceeded to join the army of the Kingdom of Sardinia, where for the next three years he was instrumental in spreading subversive republican propaganda among the troops. The army eventually discharged him for offenses that apparently had nothing to do with his political activities. His whereabouts for the next several years constitute one of several lacunae in his life that make it difficult to construct an accurate biography. He may or may not have played a role in the events that brought about the political unification of Italy in 1859–1860. He surfaces, somewhat dimly, as a rabble-rouser (*agitatore di folle*) in street protests against the Italian government in the 1860s. He published the book for which he is best remembered, *Mazzini: Histoire des conspirations mazziniennes* (1869), which he wrote under the assumed name of Ermenegildo Simoni (Simoni was his mother's name). In May 1870 he was arrested in Paris for plotting to assassinate Napoleon III. Sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison, Sappia was released in September of that same year, after the imperial government fell following the debacle of the French army at the battle of Sedan. After 1870 Sappia gave up on conspiracy and turned his attention to teaching and journalism. He moved frequently, settled in mostly inconspicuous places, and pursued various editorial projects.

Assumed names and false identities have complicated the work of biographers, for Enrico Sappia and Ermenegildo Simoni appear also as Henri Sappia, Enrico Sappia De Simone, Enrico Teodoro De Simone, and as Count of Toetto. He has also been confused with a French radical named Pierre-Théodore Emmanuel Sapia, who fought and died for the Paris Commune in 1871. Hence the real Sappia remains somewhat elusive. His upbringing, education, family life, whereabouts, and political connections for long stretches of time are the subject of guesswork. Recently discovered documents fill in some gaps, but questions remain. The very nature of Sappia's relationship with Mazzini has long been the subject of debate. The authors use questionable tactics to justify making the Mazzini connection the central theme of their study and of Sappia's life. A frequent ploy is to treat possible eventualities as established facts, as they do when discussing Sappia's contacts not only with Mazzini, but also with Giuseppe Garibaldi, Felice Orsini, and other Risorgimento figures. The editing leaves much to be desired. The text should have been scrubbed thoroughly to eliminate repetitions and digressions. Too many footnotes are approximate or downright inaccurate. Names are misspelled. Such flaws do not instill confidence in the factual accuracy of the account.

There is no doubt that there was a connection between Sappia and Mazzini. Mazzini mentioned him several times in letters, provided information for the book

Sappia was writing, and expressed a desire to help him when he was in trouble with the French police. Mazzini was seldom reluctant to work with people whom he may not have trusted entirely, as long as they could be helpful to the causes of Italian unification and republicanism. He denied any secret connections, but it is also true that he could hardly admit to them in writing without incurring the risk of compromising both himself and Sappia. Their politics were similar: both favored Italian unification, professed republican ideals, condemned the policies of Napoleon III, and were critical of socialists and Communards. But their views were not identical. Sappia thought that Mazzini was insufficiently sensitive to social issues, and therefore unlikely to win broad support for his cause. The divergences suggest that Sappia was no blind follower. There were those close to Mazzini who regarded Sappia as a double agent working for the French or Piedmontese governments. The authors do not ignore such charges, but do their best to exonerate him.

A competing theme that runs through this book explains perhaps the diffuse nature of the writing and lack of focus. It is the theme of Nice's role and place in history, on which Mauviel has written extensively. Nice (Nizza to its Italian-speaking population) was in Mazzini's time one of those "frontier towns" where different cultures and ethnic groups met and mixed. It is useful to remember that Nice was also the birthplace of Garibaldi, who regarded it as essentially Italian and considered using force to prevent its union with France in 1860. Sappia was also an Italian patriot, but he lived long enough to transcend the sentiments of his youth and accept the French incorporation of Nice. The authors suggest that the transformation makes Sappia a precursor of European unity: "Sappia in his old age was in some ways radically transformed from what he had been as a young man, for his patriotism (*amor patrio*) found a different outlet. But there was also an equally undeniable continuity with Mazzini's legacy that found expression in a pervasive cosmopolitanism and in the ideals of European unity and republicanism" (p. 442). Whether a case can be made that Sappia was indeed a precursor of European unity is one more thing about him that remains to be proven.

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ALESSIO PONZIO. *La Palestra del littorio: L'Accademia della Farnesina; un esperimento di pedagogia totalitaria nell'Italia fascista.* (Temi di storia.) Milan: FrancoAngeli. 2009. Pp. 273. €32.00.

This book traces the history of Accademia della Farnesina, which the Italian fascist regime charged with training and educating future teachers of physical education, and it argues that the Accademia was more than a center for schooling. It also aimed at training fascist youth leaders and more consequentially at trans-